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In this short paper, we respond to critics of our original paper, The agony of agonal respiration: is the
last gasp necessary?. A common thread in both Hawryluck’s and Kuhse’s responses is the difficulties
encountered when using the agent’s intentions to make moral distinctions between using neuromuscular
blocking drugs to palliate versus using neuromuscular blocking drugs to kill. Although this difficulty does
exist we maintain that the intentions of the physician must matter when providing end-of-life care.
Kuhse criticises our application of the doctrine of doubleeffect to the problem of agonal respiration.1 She pointsout that we encounter a problem with describing the act
in question—that is, the administration of muscle relaxants
during agonal respiration. We could describe the act in any
number of ways, some of which would imply that it is an act
of killing. She is correct to point out that killing is not a basic
action and we must appeal to the agent’s intentions to deter-
mine whether the act in question is killing or something else.
But this same problem occurs when we are talking about other
actions, such as taking a patient off a respirator or not resusci-
tating a patient. In some cases, these actions would constitute
killing by an act of commission or an act of omission. We jus-
tify these actions by appealing to the intentions of the actors.
We can infer a person’s intentions from his or her
circumstances, behaviour, and communications. If a physician
weans a terminally ill patient from a respirator, we do not call
this action “killing” because we infer that the physician’s
intention is to reduce the patient’s suffering, not to kill the
patient. We can make the same sort of inference in the agonal
respiration case; we infer that the physician’s intention is to
relieve suffering not to kill the patient. Obviously, intentions
are subjective and therefore epistemologically problematic—
how can we ever know what anyone intends to do? On the
other hand, end-of-life decision making and ethics would
make no sense at all if we did not assume that we can ascribe
intentions to physicians, patients, family members, and other
health care professionals. One does not need to subscribe to
the doctrine of double effect in order to grasp this basic point.
Even the well accepted practices of withholding and
withdrawing care cannot be morally justified without ascrib-
ing humane intentions to the actors. So, we admit that one
needs a theory of human intentions in order to apply the doc-
trine of double effect to the problem of agonal respiration, but
this is not a fatal flaw in our approach, since one needs a
theory of human intentions to make sense of virtually all
medical decisions at the end of life in any case.
Kuhse argues that it might sometimes be morally justifiable
to administer muscle relaxants to patients in agonal respira-
tion, even if we do not rely on the principle of double effect.
She says that administering muscle relaxants in such a case
may benefit the patient (by relieving suffering) or benefit the
patient’s family. But how can she maintain this view without
addressing problems having to do with the intentionality of
the act? If you administer muscle relaxants, your action could
be construed as killing, and most people regard killing as
immoral and illegal. It seems to us that you can respond to this
charge in two ways. First, you can defend the act by describing
it as something other than killing—that is, as relieving suffer-
ing. This is the option we prefer. Second, you could admit that
the act is indeed killing but maintain that it is justifiable kill-
ing. We would prefer to avoid construing the action as killing,
since this would make it a type of euthanasia and murder. Of
course, one could maintain that physicians should do nothing
to stop agonal respiration. They could stand by the bedside
until their dying patients take their last gasp.We see no reason
why patients or their families should be required to bear this
burden once the patient has chosen to withdraw respiratory
support and death is imminent.
Hawryluck makes a very important point when she asks
whether neuromuscular blockers might actually make the
patient’s suffering worse, if the patient is conscious, unable to
breathe, and aware of his or her inability to breathe.2 This is a
valid point. We do not know what the gasping patient may be
experiencing. Given this uncertainty, we should take steps to
reduce the patient’s suffering.
We are advocating the use of muscle relaxants in a very
small and specific group of patients. They are easy to
recognise: they are terminal, have been well sedated, are unre-
sponsive, and have entered a prolonged gasping phase. If these
patients can suffer, the likely cause of suffering would be the
intense muscle contraction of the prolonged gasps.
Hawryluck also points out difficulties with using the agent’s
intentions to make moral distinctions between using neuro-
muscular blockers to palliate v using neuromuscular blockers
to kill. We have discussed this issue in our paper and in our
response to Kuhse. We admit that the distinction between
“intending death” and “intending palliation (and foreseeing
death)” can be murky and ambiguous in end-of-life decision
making. Nevertheless, intentions (and wants, desires, and
motives) do matter, and we must do our best to understand
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these subjective states of mind. In ethics, one’s mental state
can make the difference between euthanasia/murder and pal-
liation.
Finally, Hawryluck asks if our families were prepared for
what was going to happen. In both of our case examples, the
families received a very clear description of what the end of
life would look like. The relationship was so honest that when
they asked if “there was anything else we could give their
children to stop the gasping”we answered “yes, but we cannot
use that category of drugs”. Both families pleaded that we use
the neuromuscular blocking drugs; we did not, but rather
continued to escalate our already high level of sedation.One of
us (RMP) is haunted by the memory of the syringe of
medicine being given, which he knew would not effectively
end the gasping. These families are not comforted by the fact
that we acted in an “ethically permissible” manner.
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After agreeing that the doctrine of double effect (DDE) cannot
settle the question of how actions ought to be described, Per-
kin and Resnik suggest that this is not an insurmountable
problem since “we justify these actions by appealing to the
intentions of the agents”.
This response misses the point. It rests on a confusion
between the permissibility and the justifiability of actions. Under
condition (1) of the DDE, an action is permissible if “the goal
of the action is itself good”. Hence, if I describe my action of
administering a lethal drug as “relieving suffering”, rather
than “killing”, it is in principle permissible. Whether a
permissible action is also justified is determined by condition
(4), which states that there must be a proportionately good
reason. Under the DDE, it would, other things being equal, be
permissible to cause the death of a patient, to relieve her
(temporary) suffering, but the action might well be unjusti-
fied under condition (4). On the other hand, bringing about
the death of a terminally ill and suffering patient might be
justifiable under condition (4), but would be impermissible if
the agent were (to admit that she was) “directly intending”
the patient’s death. In short, the justifiability of actions is one
thing, their permissibility is quite another.
This conclusion underlines my earlier point. Because the
DDE cannot set limits to the description of actions, it will
sometimes allow caring physicians to rig the descriptions of
end-of-life decisions they believe to be justified in such a way as to
make them also permissible.
Perkin and Resnik claim that ethics in general and end-of-
life decision making in particular presuppose that we can
ascribe intentions to agents. This claim is either ambiguous, or
false. Intentional actions presuppose deliberate and voluntary
choice. This is not the same as claiming that there is a morally
relevant distinction between what agents directly intend and
what they merely foresee. Ethics presupposes the former, but
many philosophers, ethicists, and lawyers deny the latter,
holding that moral agents are responsible for all the foreseen
consequences of their actions.
While rejecting the DDE, I have suggested that it might
sometimes be morally justifiable to bring about the death of a
patient by administering muscle relaxants. Contrary to Perkin
and Resnik, this does not presuppose a distinction between
intention and foresight. One might, for example, describe any
medical end-of-life decision (regardless of whether it involves
the administration of a lethal drug, or the foregoing of
life-sustaining treatment) as a wrongful killing if it were to
lack the consent of a competent patient, or if it is, say, contrary
to an incompetent patient’s best interests. If, on the other
hand, a dying competent patient seeks help from a doctor to
end her life, we might agree to describe this action not as
“killing” but as “helping to die”.
Traditional morality and the law prohibit killing. In light of
this, Perkin and Resnik state that they prefer to describe the
administration of muscle relaxants not as justifiable killing,
but as “as something other than killing—that is, as relieving
suffering”. As a pragmatic response this is perhaps under-
standable. But it comes at a price; it rests not only on the
deeply flawed doctrine of double effect, but also on some
dubious thinking surrounding the notion of intentional action
and the distinction between the moral permissibility and jus-
tifiability of actions.
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